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Groundwater: A Call for a
Comprehensive Management
Program
Water is acknowledged as an invaluable resource. 1 Groundwater2 is

one particular supply source for water, which may be found in large
quantities and in a wide range of areas throughout the state of Califor-

nia.' Approximately forty percent of the applied water need of California is supplied from groundwater basins.' The development of
California was influenced by groundwater5 in a major way. Groundwater provided a readily available source of water to those who settled
the state to take advantage of the many bounties of the state.6 This

purified source of water provides for irrigation making possible the watering of stock and crops,7 as well as providing a source of drinking

water for people. Thus, groundwater has played, and continues to
play, an important role in the development and economy of California.
In addition, during a drought year when surface water supplies have
been depleted, groundwater can serve as an emergency source of water,
avoiding the potentially disastrous effects on agriculture which a

drought may bring.8 Therefore, groundwater is tremendously impor-

tant to all Californians.
In California, as well as in all the arid western states, groundwater is
1.
PORT 1

SEE GOVERNOR'S COMM'N TO REVIEW CALIFORNIA WATER RIGHTS LAW, FINAL RE-

(1978) [hereinafter cited as FINAL REPORT].
2. Groundwater is defined as the water in the zone of saturation, the top of which is called
the water table. A. SCHNEIDER, GROUNDWATER RIGHTS IN CALIFORNIA 98-9. (Governor's
Comm'n to Review California Water Rights Law Staff Paper No. 2, July 1977); see also California
Department of Water Resources, Bulletin No. 118, California's Groundwater 4-5 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Bulletin No. 118].
3. Approximately 40 percent of California is underlain by groundwater basins. The
total storage capacity of all basins is some 1.3 billion acre-feet. The usable storage capacity, excluding that of a large number of the smaller basins where it has not been
determined, is 143 million acre-feet.
Bulletin No. 118, supra note 2, at 3.
4. Id.; see also FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 136. The estimated net demand for both
surface and groundwater is 31 million acre-feet. Normally "groundwater supplies twenty-four
percent of the net water demand, and forty percent of the applied water demand." FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 136.
5. See Bulletin No. 118, supra note 2, at 20.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 138.
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a limited resource.' An illustration of the limited nature of groundwater is the condition of an overdrafted groundwater basin.' 0 This

condition occurs because there is an insufficient supply of water. In
California alone, long-term overdrafting averages 2.2 million acre feet

annually. " There are forty-two groundwater basins in which some degree of overdraft has been found. 12 Eleven basins are subject to "criti-

cal overdraft".' 3 The problem of overdraft'is the most commonly
recognized problem in groundwater management in California.' 4 To
those who must continue to pump groundwater, overdrafting means

much greater expenses.'

5

Examples of the greater expenses are pump-

ing water a greater distance,' 6 as well as, the expense of sinking deeper
wells, lowering pumps, or drilling new wells.' 7 In addition to exhaust-

ing a groundwater supply, overdrafting may lead to saltwater intrusion
into fresh water aquifers.'" Another problem is land subsidence,'

9

which results from dropping groundwater pressures in a confined aquifer, causing water to be squeezed out of the clay layers so that the layers compact.2' Finally, a complex array of water quality problems also
exists in the area of groundwater management. 2' These problems in-

clude salinity, contamination, degradation, and pollution from various
sources.22 The makeup of groundwater, including chemical, physical

and bacterial components, is also affected by elements such as soil permeability, climate, drainage, irrigation practices and types of crops
grown, all of which vary from basin to basin. 23 To control the varied
problems associated with groundwater, a comprehensive management
program is necessary.24

9. See 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 15 (R. Clark ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as CLARK].
10. "Overdraft" means the condition of the basin when the amount of water extracted from
the groundwater basin exceeds the long-term average annual recharge to the basin from both
natural and imported sources, plus what has been called "temporary surplus." SCHNEIDER, supra
note 2, at 99.
11. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 140.

12. California Dep't of Water Resources, Bull. 118-80, Groundwater Basins in California 13
(1980) [hereinafter cited as Bulletin 118-80].
13. "[A] basin is subject to critical conditions when continuation of present water management practices would probably result in significant adverse overdraft-related environmental, social, or economic impacts." Id. at 11.
14. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 140.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.

18. An aquifer is defined as "a geological formation that stores, transmits, and yields significant quantities of water to wells and springs." Bulletin No. 118, supra note 2, at 4.
19. The Santa Clara and San Joaquin Valleys have suffered substantial subsidence, dropping
as much as 28 feet in one particular area in the San Joaquin Valley. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1,
at 141.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

24. See infra notes 257-301 and accompanying text.
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With few exceptions, groundwater legislation has been enacted only
since World War 11.25 The trend is toward permit systems 26 as well as

legislative efforts to combine controls and management of surface and
underground sources.27 In California the call for a comprehensive
groundwater management system has been made continuously since
the beginning of the twentieth century.2" Although California has a
comprehensive scheme regulating surface water,29 the Legislature has
failed to adopt any comprehensive management program for groundwater at a statewide level.3" As a result of this inaction, the management of groundwater has been left to local controls3' and to the courts,
which have decided water rights in a piecemeal fashion.32 Consequently there is a great deal of uncertainty in groundwater law as well
as inefficient use of water caused by the current lack of management of
our groundwater. This comment will trace the development of groundwater case law and the development of local control, both of which
have failed to efficiently manage groundwater.33 Next, the absence of
any comprehensive state regulation and management of groundwater
will be illustrated.34 Then, this comment will show that even though
both constitutional and water code policy provisions demand a comprehensive management program,35 there has been a consistent failure
on the part of the Legislature to enact an all-inclusive management
program.36 In addition, past legislative proposals have offered suggestions for an efficient management plan; however, these ill-fated proposals were not without flaws.37 The end result of the failure to manage
groundwater is uncertainty with respect to water rights, which results in
the inefficient use of water. Finally, this comment will offer a fresh
approach for a comprehensive management scheme at a statewide
level, based on Oklahoma Groundwater Law.38 The suggested program would put into effect the California Constitutional provision
which calls for specific water use to be "reasonable and beneficial...
25. 5 CLARK, supra note 9, at 414. Although there was some groundwater legislation enacted
late in the nineteenth century and early twentieth century, the main thrust of groundwater legislation has come since World War IL See 1 CLARK, supra note 9, at 163-65.
26. 5 CLARK, supra note 9, at 415.
27. Id.
28. Rossman & Steel, Forgingthe New GroundwaterLaw: Public Regulation of "Proprietary"
GroundwaterRights, 33 HASTINGs L.J. 903, 926 n.132 (1982).
29. See CAL. WATER CODE §§1200-1801.
30. See infra notes 216-37 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 157-83 and accompanying text.

32. See infra notes 42-150 and accompanying text.
33.
34.
35.
36.

See infra notes
See infra notes
See infra notes
See infra notes

42-183
184-98
201-24
224-38

and
and
and
and

accompanying
accompanying
accompanying
accompanying

text.
text.
text.
text.

37. See infra notes 227-43 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 276-96 and accompanying text.
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in the interest of the people and for public welfare."3 9 The recom-

mended program would provide California with the needed management to ensure the most efficient use of the valuable resource of

groundwater and would be consistent with the California Supreme
Court's interpretation of the constitutional provision of reasonable and
beneficial use.4" Finally, this proposed management scheme would be
a reasonable exercise of the state's police power. 4 ' The first area to be
explored is the development of case law concerning groundwater rights,

illustrating the incapacity of the courts to provide for a comprehensive
groundwater program.
THE PRESENT SYSTEM OF GROUNDWATER MANAGEMENT

At present, the "management" methods of California related to
groundwater include adjudications by the courts and controls by local
government. 42 As will be illustrated, these methods are inefficient management tools creating uncertainty in groundwater law and use.
A.

Case Law. Correlative Rights

The correlative fights doctrine has been developed and used by the
California courts to determine groundwater rights.4 3 This doctrine was
developed through case law after the rejection of the English common

law view of "reasonable use."'

The California doctrine of correlative

rights, however, causes groundwater management problems, the most
prominent of which is the specific problem of overdraft.4
Disputes in California regarding groundwater have primarily been
resolved by the courts. 4 6 Early California courts followed the English

common-law rule47 with respect to percolating groundwater 48 as first
39. CAL. CONST. art. X, §2.
40. See infra notes 303-10 and accompanying text.
41. See infra notes 303-10 and accompanying text.
42. See infra notes 43-182 and accompanying text.
43. Water Law is subdivided into various categories. The first major division is between
water found on the surface of the earth and water found below the surface of the earth. Surface
water is then subdivided into categories: diffused water, which is illustrated by water in water
courses and other waters, as in ponds. Subsurface water has been subdivided as flowing water in
subterranean channels or as percolating groundwater. Rossman & Steel, supra note 28, at 905.
44. See infra notes 49-66 and accompanying text.
45. See infra notes 71-88 and accompanying text.
46. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 2, at 3; see also 5 CLARK, supra note 9, at 414 n.27.
47. In 1871 the California Supreme Court adhered to the English common law view in Hanson v. McCue, 42 Cal. 303, 309 (1871). The court adhered to this view as late as 1899 in Vineland
Irrigation Dist. v. Azusa Irrigation Co., 126 Cal. 486, 494, 58 P. 1057, 1059 (1899).
48. According to the California Supreme Court the essential consideration in determining
percolating groundwater is that:
it is essential to the nature of percolating waters that they do not form any part of the
body or flow, surface or subterranean, of any stream. They may either be rain waters
which are slowly infiltrating through the soil, or they may be waters seeping through the
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enunciated inActon v. Blundel.49 The rule basically is that an overlying
landowner owns everything that lies below the surface of the land."
The rules applied to water running in streams were not used in groundwater adjudications because of the belief in the unascertainable movement of percolating groundwater." Thus, under the common-law rule,
52
the overlying owner had absolute control over percolating water;
therefore, one overlying owner had no cause of action if his supply of
water was lessened as a result of pumping by another overlying
53
owner.
In 1903 the California Supreme Court rejected the common-law rule
in Katz v. Walkinshaw.5 4 The court found that groundwater was not an
unlimited resource5 5 and a rule of absolute ownership would threaten
all the water resources of the state. 6 The court was of the view that
when the total water supply, including both surface water and groundwater, is limited, 7 there is the necessity of having a rule that would
protect those who already have invested capital, providing some measure of certainty to those who later would provide capital for development of groundwater sources.5 8 The Supreme Court rejected the
English common law view of absolute ownership upon the belief that
the overlying landowner had no protection in law against others in a
more favorable position,5 9 since wealthier owners could afford stronger
pumps and sink deeper wells, resulting in the taking of unlimited quantities of water to the detriment of those with more limited financial resources. 60 The Supreme Court, therefore, attempted to find a solution
that would prevent the injustices that could occur under the common
law rule.
In Katz, the California Supreme Court rejected the inequities caused
by the common law doctrine of absolute ownership, and established the
doctrine of correlative rights. 6 ' A leading authority summarizes the
banks or bed of a stream which have so far left the bed and the other waters as to have
lost their character as part of the flow.
126 Cal. 486, 494, 58 P. 1057, 1059 (1899).
49. 152 Eng. Rep. 1223 (Ex. 1843).
50. Id. at 1233-35.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. The common law rule was modified so as to impose liability to an overlying owner who
maliciously or negligently extracted water. See Bartlett v. O'Connor, 102 Cal. xvii, 4 Cal. Unrep.
610, 36 P. 513 (1894); W. HUTCHINS, THE CALIFORNIA LAw OF WATER RIGHTS 430 (1956).

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

141 Cal. 116, 74 P. 766 (1903).
See id. at 126, 74 P. at 768.
See id.
See id. at 126-27, 74 P. at 768-69.
See id.
Id. at 133, 74 P. at 771.
Id.
Id. at 134, 74 P. at 771.
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doctrine in this way:
In the exposition of that doctrine, the courts have stated the owners
of tracts that overlie a common supply of percolating water have correlative rights in the common supply; and that the exercise of one's
correlative right entitles him to make a reasonable use of the water
for the benefit and enjoyment of his overlying land. These correlative rights belong to all overlying landowners in common, and each
may use only his reasonable share when the water is insufficient to
meet the needs of all.62
Under the California correlative rights doctrine, the overlying landowner's right of reasonable use of a limited supply of percolating
groundwater is limited to his reasonable share. 63 However, the correlative owner's share will not be limited by the correlative rights of another landowner until there is the realization that the groundwater in a
particular basin is limited.' By the time this realization is made, the
basin is in a condition of overdraft. 65 Therefore, the correlative rights
limit to water use is a superficial limit, which checks water use only
66
after the damage to the basin has been done.

The correlative rights doctrine seems consistent with the California
Constitutional Amendment of 192867 that requires water to be put to
reasonable and beneficial use.68 When the two concepts are combined,
an overlying landowner has a right to the reasonable, beneficial use of
a reasonable share of groundwater for use on or in connection with his
overlying land.69 The courts, by rejecting the English common law

view in favor of correlative rights have provided the first impetus to
62. HUTCHINS, supra note 53, at 447-48. The early California courts in defining an overlying
users rights under the doctrine of correlative rights analogized to the rights of riparian landowners
in surface streams, namely, a right of reasonable use. Id. at 447-48. Justice Temple in the first
Katz v. Walkinshaw opinion, 70 P. 663 (1902), (This opinion sheds light on the correlative rights
doctrine; there is no official cite because the Supreme Court ordered its removal from the official
reporter) discussed a riparian owner's rights. A riparian owner may take a reasonable amount of
water including an amount that is equal to the entire flow, even if that amount is to the detriment
of a neighbor who has an equal right to the water. The question posed is whether the use of the
water is reasonable. Id. at 666. There were two opinions written. The first was written by Justice
Temple. Katz, 70 P. 663 (1902). The second opinion was written by Justice Shaw upon rehearing
to more fully consider the issues of the case. Katz, 141 Cal. 116, 74 P. 766 (1903). In the second
Katz opinion, Justice Shaw restated the reasonable use doctrine and applied the doctrine to overlying users. Then as to the correltive rights between overlying landowners, if there is insufficient
water for all, each overlying owner is given a "fair and just portion," even though all have equal
rights to a reasonable amount of water. 141 Cal. 116, 135. 74 P. 766, 772 (1903). Thus, correlative
rights were imposed upon the doctrine of reasonable use, resulting in the new doctrine of correlative rights. See HUTCHINS, supra note 53, at 446.
63. HUTCHINS, supra note 53, at 448.

64.
65.
66.
67.

See infra notes 71-88 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 71-78 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 71-88 and accompanying text.
CAL. CONsT. art. X, §2.
68. SCHNEIDER, supra note 2, at 6.
69.
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develop a way to supervise the various competing interests to the limited resource of groundwater.
1.

CorrelativeRights Doctrine and the "Tragedy of the Commons"

The doctrine of correlative rights is not without its problems.7 0 The
major problem caused by the doctrine is called "the tragedy of the
commons."'" Groundwater is a "common pool" resource, and like
other common pool resources, it is subject to this condition.7 2 The
problem occurs in the following way: Overlying landowners will drill
their respective wells into the common groundwater basin. Over time,
the total of drilling extraction from the basin will approximately equal
the total replenishment to the basin, 7 3 thus, the level of the basin remains at a constant state.7 4 In this state of equilibrium there is a safe
7
yield of watery.
Each overlying owner, in determining what is in his
best interest, will then decide whether he should increase the amount of
water pumped.76 The advantage to the overlying owner of obtaining a
greater amount of water for the beneficial use of the overlying land
almost invaribly exceeds the disadvantage to that particular landowner
resulting from a slightly lowered water table in the basin.7 7 The owner
ordinarily would conclude that in the best interest of his own farm, he
should pump the additional amount:
But this is the conclusion reached by each and every rational [overlying owner] . . .sharing a commons. Therein is the tragedy. Each
man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his [use]
...without limit ... in a world that is limited.78
"The tragedy of the commons" leads to overdrafting7 9 of groundwater
basins and the serious consequences that result from an overdrafted
condition.8" At some point, the increased cost of drilling deeper wells
will become so high that the owner will cease operation; however, by
that time the damage to the basin already will have been done. 8' Communities that rely on groundwater for domestic and other uses risk disruption of their economies, harm to the water basin and loss of energy
resources consumed by drilling and lifting the water from greater
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

See infra notes 71-88 and accompanying text.
See FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 143-45.
Id. at 143; Hardin, The Tragedy ofthe Commons, 162 SCIENCE, 1243, 1244 (1968).
See FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 144.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Hardin, supra note 72, at 1244.
FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 144.
See supra notes 71-88 and accompanying text.
FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 144.
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depths.8 2 The correlative rights doctrine, which causes "the tragedy of
the commons," encourages these problems by forcing a landowner to
drill for additional water at a damaging cost to the basin.13 Resolution
of disputes is attempted in a piecemeal fashion, at a great expense, and
possibly after the damage to a basin has been done. 4 Correlative
rights management by the courts has not been overly successful as illustrated by the continuing and increasing problem of overdraft."
Agriculture uses 85 percent of the water in California.8 6 The importance of agriculture to the state economically and as a food supply cannot be underestimated.8 7 A "no action" groundwater management
system in the state can only lead to disaster.8 8 To some extent, the
courts have recognized the problem of overdraft and have modified the
doctrine of correlative rights to deal with overdrafting.
B.

Case Law. Correlative Rights Adapted

The courts drew upon the law involving appropriative rights to influence correlative rights.8 9 Therefore, prior to analyzing how the adaptation of correlative rights was accomplished, a discussion of
appropriative rights must be made.
1. Appropriative Rights
Groundwater is subject to a claim of prior appropriation if there is
surplus water in excess of the reasonable and beneficial needs of the
overlying owners and if the water can be used reasonably and beneficially on nonoverlying lands.' The measure of the appropriative right
extends only to beneficial uses and does not extend a right to take additional water in the future. Between appropriators, priorities in time
govern their respective rights; thus, the earlier appropriator can take all
that he can beneficially use of the surplus water, up to what he has
previously used, before the latter appropriator may use any.9 2 If no
surplus water exists, then no appropriative right can be gained. 93 The
appropriator that follows the overlying user is limited to using only that
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id.
See id.
See infra notes 90-136 and accompanying text.
See supra and infra notes 71-88 and accompanying text.
FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 144.
See id.at 145.
Id.
See supra notes 90-114 and accompanying text.
Rossmann & Steel, supra note 28, at 908. See generally HUTCHINS, supra note 53, at 456-

61.
91. City of San Bernardino v. City of Riverside, 186 Cal. 7, 31, 198 P. 784, 794 (1921).
92. HUTCHINS, supra note 53, at 456.
93. Id. at 457.
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water which is surplus to the overlying use.94 If the appropriator's use
is acquired prior to the overlying owner's use the landowner's right of
use is limited to a "quantity necessary for use."95 Appropriative rights,
therefore, are another source of legal rights to groundwater that must
be considered when the entire scheme of groundwater management is
to be examined.9 6 When there is surplus water, appropriation is at its
strongest point. When there is no surplus, then the correlative rights of
overlying landowners take precedence, helping to preserve the finite
resource. 97 There still exists, however, the problem of overlying landowners draining the basins to the extent of overdraft. The California
Supreme Court in the case of The City of Pasadena v. The City of A1hambra98 attempted to resolve the problem by developing the "mutual
prescription doctrine."9 9
2. The City of Pasadena v. The City of Alhambra and the
Development of the Mutual PrescrptionDoctrine
Courts increasingly looked for physical solutions to apply where the
adherence to the established legal doctrine of correlative rights would
lead to the excessive waste of water and the crippling problem of overdraft."° The California Supreme Court in Pasadena attempted a physical solution by the development and application of the new legal
doctrine of mutual prescription.'
The Supreme Court first limited the
groundwater extraction to that of safe yield.'
The court then had to
decide who was to bear the burden of reduced groundwater extraction
to limit the mining to the safe yield. 10 3 At this point, the court departed
from Katz v. Walkinshaw and later California court interpretations of
the interaction of correlative rights and appropriative rights." ° The
Supreme Court was determined that there would not be an unequal
distribution of the burden to reduce drilling, in order to reduce the
overdrafted condition of the basin, especially since all the parties in94. Id.
95. See Katz v. WaIkinshaw, 141 Cal. 116, 135, 74 P. 766, 772 (1903). These rules are modified with respect to groundwater storage rights; an importer of water to an underground basin has
first priority to the amount of water the importer added to the basin's water supply. See City of
Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d 199, 257-59, 537 P.2d 1250, 1292-93, 123 Cal.
Rptr. 1, 43-4 (1975); see also Rossmann & Steel, supra note 28, at 909.
96. See supra notes 90-95 and accompanying text.
97. Rossmann & Steel, supra note 28, at 909.
98. 33 Cal. 2d 908, 207 P.2d 17 (1949).
99. See generally SCHNEIDER, supra note 2, at 19-29.
100. SCHNEIDER, supra note 2, at 19.
101. Id. at 22.
102. Groundwater extraction can be limited from a basin "for the purpose of protecting the
supply and preventing a permanent undue lowering of the water table." 33 Cal. 2d. at 924, 207
P.2d at 27.
103. SCHNEIDER, supra note 2, at 20.
104. 33 Cal. 2d at 932, 207 P.2d at 32.
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volved had been pumping water for many years unconcerned with the

damage being done and unconcerned with attempting to protect the
basin.1" 5 Thus, the Supreme Court in Pasadena,through the use of the

mutual prescription doctrine,"° found a way to equitably reduce the
rights of all involved rather than totally eliminate some of those
rights."0 7 The court found the elements of prescription to be present in
the case at hand. 08 The court held:
[P]rescriptive rights were established by appropriations made in the
western unit subsequent to the commencement of the overdraft, ...
such rights were acquired against both overlying owners and prior
appropriators, [and] ... the overlying owners and prior appropriators also obtained, or preserved, rights by reason of the water which
they pumped. . 1...09
The Supreme Court through this holding limited pumping from the

basin to the safe yield of that basin." 0 All parties in the action were
restricted to a proportionate reduction in the highest continuous
amount of water each overlying owner had pumped and put to beneficial use in any five year period after overdraft began and before the

complaint was filed."II The parties were entitled to this proportion provided there was no cessation of use by that party during any subsequent continuous five year period.'

12

The correlative rights doctrine

enabled the Supreme Court to quantify rights and avoid the total destruction of any of the rights involved, all while working toward the
goal of controlling the problem of overdraft." 3 The ruling in

Pasadena, generally, was a practical solution involving the parties
before the court and the particular basin involved.' 14

The ruling of the Supreme Court only perpetuates the practice of
unlimited drilling until overdraft problems occur. An overlying owner

is encouraged to pump a basin to overdraft because he cannot obtain a
prescriptive right until he is taking adverse to another's right." 5 In ad105. Id.
106. See infra notes 107-109 and accompanying text.
107. For a prescriptive right to groundwater to ripen, it must be established that the taking of

non-surplus groundwater was actual, open and notorious, hostile and adverse to the other party,
continuous and uninterrupted for the statutory period of 5 years, and under a claim of right. Id.
at 926, 207 P.2d at 29.
108. All the parties in Pasadena stipulated to all of the necessary elements except for the 5
year period of adverse use. The court went on to hold that the lowering of the water table gave all
parties notice of the overdraft and that commencement of the overdraft provided sufficient adversity to establish that element of prescription. Id. at 929-30, 207 P.2d at 29-31.
109. Id. at 933, 207 P.2d at 32.
110. SCHNEIDER, supra note 2, at 22.
111. 33 Cal. 2d at 922, 207 P.2d at 26; see also SCHNEIDER, supra note 2, at 23.
112. 33 Cal. 2d at 922, 207 P.2d at 26; see also SCHNEIDER, supra note 2, at 22.
113. SCHNEIDER, supra note 2, at 23.
114. See id. at 23-24.
115. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
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dition, adverse users will not even discuss possible overdraft until the

problem is in existence. The parties must then go to court to resolve
the dispute. This after-the-fact, piecemeal management system does

not take into account the resources and overdraft problems at a statewide level and is not the most efficient method of managing a statewide

problem.
The mutual prescription doctrine was not to be the last word of the
California Supreme Court with respect to resolving groundwater dis-

putes. In 1955, the city of Los Angeles filed suit against the cities of
San Fernando, Glendale, Burbank and other groundwater pumpers."I6
Los Angeles asserted a prior right to all the groundwater in the upper

Los Angeles River area."i 7 The city attempted to stop all other pumpers from extracting the groundwater without permission from the city
of Los Angeles."' The resulting Supreme Court opinion of The City of
Los Angeles v. The City of San Fernando,"9 if taken to its logical conclusion, means that the mutual prescription doctrine will not be used
again unless stipulated by the parties. 2 ° San Fernando illustrates the

continuing modification of the correlative rights doctrine by the California Supreme Court.
3. Effect of The City of Los Angeles v. The City of San
Fernando on the Mutual PrescriptionDoctrine.121

In San Fernando, the court believed that formal legal doctrines of
groundwater law should be subordinate to equitable, physical, and

practical solutions.' 22 The San Fernando case1 23 rejected the previous
reliance in Pasadenaon prescriptive rights on two bases: first, the court

interpreted the California Civil Code 24 to prohibit prescriptive rights
from ripening against the city of Los Angeles;25 second, the court re116. City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d 199, 207, 537 P.2d 1250, 1258,
123 Cal. Rptr. 1, 9 (1975); see also SCHNEIDER, supra note 2, at 29.
117. 14 Cal. 3d 199, 207, 537 P.2d 1250, 1258, 123 Cal. Rptr. 1, 9 (1975); see also SCHNEIDER,
supra note 2, at 26.
118. 14 Cal. 3d 199, 207, 537 P.2d 1250, 1258. 123 Cal. Rptr. 1, 9 (1975);see also SCHNEIDER,
supra note 2, at 26.
119. 14 Cal. 3d 199, 537 P.2d 1250, 123 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1975).
120. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 2, at 30.
121. See generally id. at 29-31.
122. 14 Cal. 3d at 265-66 n.61, 537 P.2d at 1298-99, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 45-50; see also Rossman
& Steel, supra note 28, at 910.
123. In San Fernando, certain extractors competing with Los Angeles asserted a mutually
prescriptive restraint on Los Angeles' extractions, citing Pasadena as authority. Los Angeles, in opposition, argued that the city should have an absolute first call on any future
imports of Owens Valley water to the San Fernando Basin.
Rossmann & Steel, supra note 28, at 910.
124. CAL. CIV. CODE §1007.
125. 14 Cal. 3d at 270-77, 537 P.2d at 1301-07, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 51-58. California Civil Code
section 1007 precludes prescriptive rights against the property of certain public entities. See also
Rossmann & Steel, supra note 28, at 910.

1289

Pac#ifc Law Journal/ Vol. 14

fused to apply the physical solution, provided for by "mutually prescriptive rights" in Pasadena,to the facts of the San Fernando case. 126
The Supreme Court in San Fernando believed that the Pasadena case
reached a fair result on the facts presented. 27 The theory of mutual
prescription in Pasadena,however, could no longer be relied upon.'28
The Supreme Court espoused the view that .California courts should
now base their decisions upon "broad equitable powers" to30 accomplish
physical solutions129 rather than legal doctrinal theories.'
In San Fernando, the Supreme Court set forth a court administered
management method through adjudication that was to take into account the many equitable factors that would influence a fair result. 3 '
In a groundwater basin adjudication, however, the conclusion of one
court as to the best, most pragmatic solution may not be the most efficient management solution.' 32 A court will not be examining the overall, comprehensive water problems when that court is adjudicating the
rights of the parties before it. 133 An adjudicating court will not be considering other interested parties who are not before the court, nor will
the court be examining the state interest in managing a scarce resource. 134 The Supreme Court, even by adapting the correlative rights
doctrine to present groundwater problems, cannot provide for the most
efficient management system. At best, judicial solutions can only be
piecemeal problem solving. Not only does the modified correlative
rights doctrine lead to inefficient management, but that doctrine also
causes uncertainty in groundwater law. 135 Currently, groundwater
users have very uncertain ideas of what their respective rights are if the
basin has not been adjudicated. 36 This state of the law prevents fulfillment of the constitutional requirement that water be put to reasonable
137
and beneficial use.
126. 14 Cal. 3d at 267, 537 P.2d at 1299, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 50; see also Rossmann & Steel, supra
note 28, at 910.
127. 14 Cal. 3d at 266, 537 P.2d at 1298, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 49; see also Rossmann & Steel, supra
note 28, at 910.
128. "[The theory of prescriptive rights is not conducive to] the most equitable apportionment
of water according to need. A true equitable apportionment would take into account many more
factors." 14 Cal. 3d at 265, 537 P.2d at 1298, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 49 (footnote omitted); see also
Rossmann & Steel, supra note 28, at 910.
129. 14 Cal. 3d at 292, 537 P.2d at 1317, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 68.
130. Rossman & Steel, supra note 28, at 911.
131. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 143.
132. See Rossmann & Steel, supra note 28, at 911.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 143.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 21-5.
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C. Uncertainty, CorrelativeRights and The Failure to Fufil the
Requirement of Reasonable andBeneficial Use
Uncertainty in groundwater law and the impact of this uncertainty
on overlying owners is a significant problem hampering management
and supervision of water uses.1 38 One source of uncertainty is that dormant rights 139 to groundwater may suddenly become active when the
overlying user decides to use previously unextracted water. 4 ° In addition, the right to groundwater is not to a specific quantity but is rather a
reasonable use-correlative share amount. 41 Finally, the inefficient allocation of the scarce resource of water increases uncertainty since no
owner of a water right will know how much of the limited supply he
142
will be entitled to use.
143
Uncertainty of rights in groundwater law has injurious effects.
Costly and recurrent litigation is one effect that can only result in sporadic efforts to solve an ever worsening water problem.'" Another injurious effect of uncertainty of legal rights is that rational choices by
overlying users may be inhibited.14 When certainty of rights is accomplished then an overlying landowner will have the security of knowing
precisely the extent of his individual right to the water.' 4 6 This certainty gives the impetus for planning and rational investment and without certainty there can only be the lack of rational management. 47
Indeed, even irrational thinking may result, in that an overlying driller
may decide to increase usage as much as possible in order to get the
most use from the water before the limited resource runs out, to the
detriment of overlying landowners. Uncertainty adds further to the
cost of litigation because the quantity of a dormant right is unknown
and the only way to determine accurately a user's individual rights is
by going to court.' 4 8 Continuing litigation is a tremendous drain of
time and economic resources for all parties involved. 149 In addition,
some of the overlying landowners may not have the resources for protracted litigation; 50 therefore, they cannot afford the opportunity to
138.
139.
water.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id.
A dormant right exists when a legal doctrine confers a present right to the future use of
Id.at 18.
See id. at 18-21.
See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
See FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 25.
See id. at 21-23.
See id. at 22.
See id. at 16.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 16, 143.
See id. at 159.
See id.
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protect their rights. The result is the inefficient use of water which is
generated by uncertainty illustrating that overdrafting and uncertainty
of rights go hand in hand. California needs to develop an efficient
management program that will bring the problem of overdraft under
control as well as bring more certainty to groundwater rights.' 5 At
present, however, there is no comprehensive program. 152 There is only
management combined with some scattered state
some limited
53
regulations.
CURRENT GROUNDWATER CONTROLS

Currently there exist limited management forms over various basins
in California, 5 4 which are in addition to the adjudication approach of
the courts. The dominant form of control is management at the local
level.' 55 The state water codes, however, do have some provisions that
deal with groundwater on a statewide basis.156 This section of the comment will focus on how these "management systems" have failed and
will continue to fail to provide the needed efficiency and certainty that
is essential to the efficient and prolonged use of the valuable resource of
groundwater.
A.

Management at a Local Level

Generally, local groundwater management has occurred on an ad
hoc basis in response to local initiative.' 5 7 Local programs have proven
to be successful in areas where there is a surplus supply of water, especially in dealing with specific problems, including seawater intrusion' 5 8
and critically lowered water tables. 59 Without a supplemental supply
of water, however, local programs have a very difficult time being successful.' 60 One authority suggests that it is essential that there be a
supplemental supply of water to effect a successful basin management
program. 16 ' Supplemental water ensures cooperation between adverse
users to control overdrafting, because a particular user's supply is not
threatened if water can be obtained from another source. However,
insufficient supplies lead to adversity and the failure to cooperate
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

1292

Id. at 166-67.
See supra notes 101-37 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 157-98 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 157-98 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 157-77 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 187-98 and accompanying text.
FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 145.
Id. at 146.
Id.
Id.
Krieger & Banks, Groundwater Basin Management, 50 CAL. L. RFv. 56, 61 (1962).
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which local subdivisions cannot overcome; therefore, the problem of
overdraft is not resolved. In areas similar to the San Joaquin Valley,
where there is a serious overdraft problem and a lack of surface water,
no management programs are present.' 62 Contractual and fiscal con-

siderations may constrain the policy-making decisions of local water
63
entities and their abilities to use imported supplemental supplies.
The state, however, has a wide financial base and will be better able to
take into account the statewide water situation and import water more
efficiently into the overdrafted regions, thus overcoming local management's inability to manage when there is no supplemental water. In the
areas where local programs have been relatively successful, there have

developed basically two main approaches.164
1. Local Management by Water District

The first approach involved is the formation of a water district with
powers to carry out a groundwater management program. 165 These

districts normally are organized on the basis of a convenient political
subdivision.' 66 The Orange County Water District has been the leader

in the water district nonadjudication approach to groundwater management. 67 Water districts use "basin equity assessments"' 168 which
either increase or decrease the cost of the groundwater thereby influ-

encing the amount of groundwater that is consumed

69 and

in turn reg-

ulating the amount of water to be pumped from the ground. 17o Another

central function of water districts is the importation of water to replen7
ish the groundwater supply.' '
2. Local Management by CourtAppointed Watermasters
The second major approach to local management is the court162. SCHNEIDER, supra note 2, at 61.

163. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 1,at 151-53.
164. Id. at 146-49.
165. A district may have a wide range of powers; for example, the power to require pumpers
to file periodic water production statements. Other powers may include a broad power to raise
finances, as by levying a pump tax. Id. at 146-47.
166. Id. at 146.
167. Id.
168. The Orange County Water District Board sets a basin production percentage for one
year. This amount is the maximum amount that should be extracted from the basin that year.
Based on information regarding supplemental supplies and a pumper's own extractions, a
pumper's extractions are required to be a certain amount. The ratio of groundwater pumping to
total use may be more or less than the production percentage for the entire basin. If that ratio is
more, then the pumper must pay the district. If that ratio is less then the district will pay the
pumper. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 2, at 4849.
169. Id. at 147.
170. Id.
171. Id.
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appointed watermaster.172 Normally, the court will appoint a
watermaster to be the policy maker for a groundwater basin pursuant
to an agreement among groundwater users in an adjudicated area. 73
The watermaster's main resource is the power to levy replacement
water assessments. 74 The assessment is a charge on pumping in excess
of a pumper's adjudicated share of the yield of the basin. t 75 The
watermaster may also conduct a groundwater replenishment program,176 as well as control storage in the groundwater basin. 177 Both
types of local management systems have inherent problems that will
not allow for a comprehensive statewide management program to be
designed solely on the basis of local control.
3. The Failureof Local Management

Local management cannot provide for the management of the limited resource at a statewide level. First, there was the problem of no
supplemental water in some districts, which means that local management cannot be established throughout the state. 178 Another problem
is that local management depends upon setting up a scheme based on
local political subdivisions including cities, counties, or general districts. 179 Groundwater basins, however, do not limit themselves to neat
political boundaries. 180 Thus, comprehensive local management would
be exceptionally difficult when more than one political subdivision attempts to manage a regional groundwater basin. This especially would
be true in an area that lacks a supplemental supply of water.' 8 ' Local
management, however, does have a role in managing the resource of
groundwater. Currently some local agencies do manage the resource
efficiently when there is supplemental water. 8 2 Local input is needed
to help understand the intricacies involved in dealing with the local
management. Since, however, groundwater is a limited resource and
not confined to particular areas within defined political lines, local
needs may cause disputes between the local managers that would need
a neutral statewide program as referee to help resolve the dispute. The
172. Id. at 147-49.
173. Id. at 147.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. To have a watermaster appointment made, a local groundwater ajudication will end
with a stipulation for judgment. The parties abandon strict water law doctrine and agree to an
allocation they believe to be fair and reasonable. The parties then agree to a watermaster management system. Id. at 148.
178. See supra notes 160-62 and accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 165-77 and accompanying text.
180. See Bulletin No. 118, supra note 2, at 2.
181. See supra notes 160-62 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 166-68 and accompanying text.
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problems inherent in local management call for a statewide control
combined with local management so that the difficult decisions concerning the limited resource can be made. If the limited resource of
groundwater is going to be put to the best use for all in the state then
statewide management is called for. A comprehensive program must
replace the ad hoc approach of local management that acts only when
there is surplus water or a crisis. Finally, the existing state statutory
law regarding groundwater is inadequate to resolve these problems.' 8 3
B.

Scope of Current State Statutory Control

Although the state currently has a broad range of powers to manage
surface water, 84 there is no comprehensive statewide groundwater
management program.'8 5 Scattered throughout the state Water Code
are various provisions that do deal with groundwater, 86 but none of
these Code sections provides California with a needed management
program. The Department of Water Resources (hereinafter referred to
as DWR) has guidelines for counties to use in adopting well construction and abandonment ordinances, 1 87 as well as informational filing requirements with DWR for well digging, deepening, reperforating,
abandoning or destruction. 8 8 These provisions deal only with water
quality problems; they do not resolve the worsening problem of overdraft in the groundwater basins of the state. DWR also is authorized to
conduct investigations and studies of projects that could protect
groundwater 89 since the Legislature has declared that the policy of the
state is to prevent irreparable damage to and correct impaired use of
groundwater. 90 But the power to conduct studies does not enable the
state to enact an all-encompassing statewide management program.
Further, the Porter-Cologne Water Quality Control Act' establishes
statewide water quality control that is administered on a regional basis, 192 but the Act does not come to terms with the problem of overdraft. In addition, the Recordation Act' 93 requires a pumper to report
to the State Water Resources Control Board [hereinafter cited as
94
SWRCB] each year how much groundwater that individual pumped,
183.
184.
185.
186.

See infra notes 186-198 and accompanying text.
See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 145.
See infra notes 187-188 and accompanying text.

187. See CAL. WATER CODE §13800.

188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

See id.at §§13750-13751.
Id.at §12923.
Id. at §12922.
Id.at §§13000-13988.
Id. at §13000.
Id. at §§4999-5008.
Id. at §5002.
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but it does not sanction against overdraft. Also the Recordation Act is
limited to only four southern California counties.' 95 Finally, SWRCB
has the power to initiate an adjudication of a groundwater basin to
96
prevent destruction of or irreparable injury to groundwater quality. 1
SWRCB has never exercised this power.' 97 There are other Code provisions; however, none establishes a groundwater management program. 9 8 This general sampling of statewide provisions relating to
groundwater illustrates that at present there is no statutory basis for the
needed comprehensive management program.
This comment has illustrated the ineffectiveness of local management and the lack of a comprehensive system at the state level. '99 The
time to enact a comprehensive statewide management program has arrived. The limited resource of groundwater must be preserved. Only
through preservation may the bounties of a limited resource be continued for the welfare of all. The California Constitution and policy
statements in the state Water Code call out for a comprehensive management program.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATE MANDATES FOR MANAGEMENT AND

THE FAILURE TO REACT

Presently, the Constitutional Amendment of 1928,200 as well as
Water Code provisions, call for a comprehensive management system. 20 All past attempts to pass a groundwater program enacting these
provisions have failed, 20 2 and the need for an all-inclusive management
program only grows more pressing. The Constitutional Amendment of
1928203 requires that water be put to beneficial use and in order for
groundwater to be put to beneficial use there must be enacted an overall groundwater management program.
A.

ConstitutionalAmendment of 1928
In 1928, in response to the decision of Herminghausv. Southern Cali-

195. The Recordation Act is limited to the counties of Riverside, San Bernardino, Los Angeles, and Ventura. Id. at §500(c). The Legislature found that only those counties should be in-

cluded because of the combination of light rainfall, concentrated population, agricultural to urban
transition and dependence on generally overdrawn groundwater supplies. Id. at §4999.
196: Id. at §2100.
197. SCHNEIDER, supra note 2, at 85.
198. See generally CAL. WATER CODE §§1005.1-.14, 1242, 7075; 23 CAL. ADMIN. CODE

§64.10-.13.
199. See supra notes 157-78 and accompanying text.
200. CAL. CONST. art. X, §2.

201. See infra notes 224-37 and accompanying text.
202. See infra notes 224-38 and accompanying text.
203. CAL. CONsT. art. X, §2.
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JorniaEdison Company,2° the Constitution of California was amended
so that the right to water or the use of water was limited only to the

water reasonably necessary for the beneficial use to be served.2 °5
Under the amended Constitution, the right to use water does not extend to any wasteful or unreasonable use of that water.2 °6
The Amendment provided constitutional status to the reasonable
and beneficial use rule enunciated in Katz v. Walkinshaw. 2 7 Although

the constitutional provision does not specifically so state, the provision
has been held to apply to groundwater. 0 8 The enactment of this con-

stitutional provision illustrates the commitment of the state to put
water to the most beneficial use. 20 9 By making the commitment to the
reasonable use of water, the state will increase productivity and prevent
the waste of a valuable resource.2
In Gin S. Chow v. City of Santa Barbara, l t the California Supreme
Court held that the constitutional amendment of 1928 was a proper
exercise of the police power of the state.21 2 The court, in Gin S. Chow,

recognized the importance of groundwater to the "well-being" and
2 13

"prosperity" of the state
and the fact that the limited resource of
groundwater must be preserved. 21 4 In a later case, 2 5 the supreme court
expounded the view that a beneficial use would be defined by the facts
and circumstances of each case and that what is beneficial at one point
in time may later become a waste of water.21 6 Therefore, the supreme
court would have flexibility in defining beneficial uses for the acquisi-

tion of water rights. In addition, there is flexibility in determining beneficial versus wasteful uses. Generally, the California Constitution
calls for California to make the most "reasonable and beneficial" use of
the groundwater resource; however, California has not fulfilled this re204. 200 Cal. 81, 252 P. 607 (1926); see Joslin v. Marin Mun. Water Dist., 67 Cal. 2d 132, 137,
429 P.2d 889, 892, 60 Cal. Rptr. 377, 380 (1967). Herminghaus held that a single riparian landowner could insist on maximum flow of water, at the expense of upstream beneficial uses. 200
Cal. at 111-12, 252 P. at 618-19. The 1928 Constitutional Amendment was designed to prevent
waste by allowing only reasonable beneficial uses rather than allowing proprietary doctrine to
dictate that one may use the water to the exclusion of others. Rossmann & Steel, supra note 28, at
911 n.54.
205. CAL. CONsT. art. X, §2.
206. Id.
207. 141 Cal. 116, 74 P. 766 (1903); see Rossmann & Steel, supra note 28, at 911.
208. Peabody v. City of Vallejo, 2 Cal. 2d 486 (1935).
209. See CAL. CONsT. art. X, §2.
210. See CAL. CONST. art. X, §2.
211. 217 Cal. 673, 22 P.2d 5 (1933).
212. Id. at 701, 22 P.2d at 16.
213. Id.; see Rossmann & Steel, supra note 28, at 912.
214. 217 Cal. at 701, 22 P.2d at 16; see Rossmann & Steel, supra note 28, at 912.
215. Tulare Irrig. Dist. v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irrig. Dist., 3 Cal. 2d 489, 567, 45 P.2d 972, 1007
(1935); see Rossmann & Steel, supra note 28, at 912.
216. 3 Cal. 2d at 567, 45 P.2d at 1007; see Rossmann & Steel, supra note 28, at 912.
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quirement.217 The state has allowed the problem of overdraft to
worsen without enacting any program to control the groundwater resource. 218 The state Water Code contains policy statements that suggest the need for a comprehensive groundwater management program;
nevertheless, the state has failed to enact this essential program.
B.

California Water Policy and the Failureto React

The California Water Code calls for the more efficient use of
groundwater. A comprehensive groundwater management program
would ensure efficiency in the beneficial use of groundwater. The
Water Code declares that the people of the State of California have a
"paramount interest" in the use of surface and groundwater 21 9 and the
state must determine when the water should be controlled for the public benefit. 22° The Water Code goes on to declare that the people of
California have a vital concern that the state protect the public interest
in the development of all the water resources of the state. 221 The state
should determine in what ways both groundwater and surface water
are to be developed for the greatest public benefit.2 22 In addition, the
public interest demands the protection of groundwater basins in order
to prevent irreparable damage to them 223 as a result of overdraft conditions. 2 4 The state, in these policy provisions, expresses the view that
the protection of the limited resource of groundwater is of vital concern
to the public interest of the state of California. A comprehensive
groundwater management program must be enacted to protect that
public interest.225 The Legislature, however, has totally failed to enact
a program that would fulfill the state's own policy declarations.226
The Final Report of the Governor's Commission to Review Califor227
nia Water Rights Law (hereinafter referred to as the Commission)
recommends that in view of the severe and extensive groundwater
problems in California, legislation should be enacted providing for
groundwater management. 228 The proposed legislation by the Commission allows for management by local entities. 229 The state is enSee infra notes 226-37 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 226-37 and accompanying text.
CAL. WATER CODE §§104-217.
Id.
Id. at §105.
Id.
Id. at §12922.
Id.
See infra notes 244-99 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 227-37 and accompanying text.
227. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 1.
228. Id. at 165.
229. See id. at 166-69. For text of proposed legislation see id. at 170-250.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
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powered to review the local management programs periodically to
assure uniformity on a policy level. 3 0 The Commission believed that
with many successful local management programs already in existence, 23 ' combined with the local expertise over the varied groundwater
basins, 23223a strong local groundwater approach was appropriate.233 In
1979, the Legislature considered the statutory approach advocated by
the Commission. Senate Bill 47234 and Assembly Bill 442235 contained
essentially the same language as that recommended by the Commission. Each bill contained legislatively designated areas needing a comprehensive groundwater management program. The bill allowed for
local control over those management programs. SWRCB would then
periodically review the local management programs to ensure uniformity at a policy level. Both of these bills died in committee.2 36 The
groundwater provisions reappeared in committee in mid-1980 only,
again, to go down to defeat.23 7 Various strong lobbying interests have
continually been able to thwart the needs of the state by destroying any
attempt to secure some type of comprehensive management system.2 38
In the view of this comment, however, the defeated proposed legislation, based on the final report by the Commission was not the most
efficient program to establish a comprehensive groundwater management program. The recommended legislation carried with it the
problems inherent in local management. 239 Local management, to be
successful, needs supplemental water supplies;24 however, in the areas
of critical overdraft when supplemental supplies are not available, the
local programs have great difficulty in efficiently managing the resource. 24 1 The state needs greater control to manage efficiently and
combine the areas of supplemental water and areas of limited water so
that the overall picture of groundwater in California may be im230. Id.
231. See id. at 166.
232. See id.
233. See id.
234. Senate Bill 47 failed January 31, 1980. See SENATE FINAL HISTORY, 1979-80 Reg. Sess.
41 (1980).
235. See ASSEMBLY FINAL HISTORY, 1979-80 Reg. Sess. 334 (1980).
236. During this session the Legislature did pass California Water Code section 12924; this
section directs the Department of Water Resources to identify the groundwater basins in the state,
including those subject to critical overdraft. See Act of Sept. 7, 1978 Ch. 601, 1978 Cal. Stat. 2037
(codified at CAL. WATER CODE §12924).
237. See SENATE FINAL HISTORY, 1979-80 Reg. Sess. 787 (1980).

238. The Los Angeles Times reported that passage of the bills was blocked by those interests
who "are against any semblance of state supervision on the use of underground water supplies. . ." Los Angeles Times, Aug. 26, 1980, pt. 1, at 3, 21; col. 2.
239. See supra notes 178-180 and accompanying text.
240. Id.
241. Id.
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proved.24 2 This comment does not suggest that local programs are not
important in knowledge of and expertise in local intricacies; however,
state control is needed to best manage groundwater for the use of all.243
IMPETUS FOR CHANGE:

A

PROPOSAL FOR COMPREHENSIVE

GROUNDWATER MANAGEMENT IN CALIFORNIA

Overdrafting is the most commonly recognized problem confronting
groundwater basins today. 244 Combined with and resulting from overdrafting is the problem of an overlying user's uncertainty as to what
water he actually owns.24 5 Current "management" systems have not
helped to alleviate any of these problems; indeed, the problems have
only worsened. 246 This comment will propose a comprehensive
groundwater management program that will come to grips with overdrafting and uncertainty, offering hope for the preservation of the limited resource of groundwater.24 7
Three major components form the basis of an efficient comprehensive groundwater program that would control groundwater
problems.24 8 First is the storage and conjunctive use of water,24 9 which
would establish management of all the water of the state, as well as
provide water for areas of particular need.25 0 The second component is
a complete administrative process based on Oklahoma Groundwater
Law 25' which would lead to certainty in the law.252 Finally, local input 253 into management of the resource of groundwater would provide
25 4
the state with invaluable information concerning local intricacies.
Although no comprehensive management program has been enacted, it
has been shown that California needs a management system. 25 5 New
management concepts, therefore, must continue to be advocated until
the Legislature can see fit to tackle the politically sensitive issue thai
groundwater management poses. The first component of a modern
proposal for groundwater management
should include the storage anc
25 6
conjunctive use of water.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
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A. Storage and Conjunctive Use of Water
"Conjunctive use"2' 57 refers to the storage of water in groundwater
258
basins combined with the use of surface water when it is available.
Groundwater is used when surface water is not available.2 19 Communities have for some time relied on basic groundwater storage programs
as a method of managing groundwater. 260 The California courts recently entered the area of storage rights to determine who has the right
to use underground storage space and whether a person storing has a
right to recapture the stored water. 26 1 The cases of Niles Sand Gravel
Company v. Alameda County Water District26 2 and The City of Los Angeles v. The City of San Fernando263 answer some of these questions. 26
The Niles and San Fernando cases made possible a general storage program.2 65 First, these cases created a right allowing a public entity to
import water into groundwater basins when space is available without
paying overlying landowners. 6 6 Next, a public entity has the right to
protect the water that it has stored in the basin from expropriation by
others.2 67 Finally, a public entity has the right to recapture water it has
268
stored in that basin when the water is needed.
Niles and San Fernando would allow public agencies to create comprehensive groundwater storage programs by recognizing their authority, in the public interest, to store water in an underground basin for the
use of the overlying community,2 6 9 therefore allowing the storage of
needed supplemental water which is essential to a management program. Conjunctive use and storage of water, which was sanctioned by
Niles and San Fernando, would use public agencies at a statewide level
to make the optimum use of the existing resources of the state.270
257. "Conjunctive use" and "Conjunctive operation" are defined as:
The coordinated operation of a groundwater basin and surface water supplies. One purpose is to artificially recharge a basin during years of above-average precipitation so that
roundwater can be withdrawn during years of below-average precipitation, when surac supplies are less than normal. Conjunctive operation also refers to meeting the
needs of an area through the coordinated use of surface water during years when it is
available and groundwater in years when surface water is not available.
SCHNEIDER, supra note 2, at 98.
258. Id. at 63.
259. Id.
260. Robie & Donovan, Water Management of the Future: A Groundwater Storage Program
for the CaliorniaState Water Project, 11 PAC. L.J. 41, 52 (1979).

261.Id
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.

37 Cal. App. 3d 924, 112 Cal. Rptr. 841 (1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
14 Cal. 3d 199, 537 P.2d 1250, 123 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1975).
See generally id.; 37 Cal. App. 3d 924, 112 Cal. Rptr. 841 (1974).
Robie & Donovan, supra note 260, at 54.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 55.
See id. at 62.
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Conjunctive use will allow the state to preserve water sources currently available and that become available to the state. Supplementary
water should be stored in order to use that extra water in areas of low
water supply.27 1 If supplemental water exists in a particular area of the
state and if there is not sufficient storage space in that area, then the
supplemental water can be lost.272 The state should oversee the transfer and storage in other basins that have a greater storage capacity. 73
This process would make for greater preservation of water and allow
for more water to be available for those basins in the state that are
subject to overdraft. To take into account all the supplemental water
supplies as well as all the available storage basins in the state, state
control is needed.2 74 Therefore, the broad state control over the conjunctive use of water may be viewed as the first component in a comprehensive statewide management program that would take into
account all the present water supplies of the state and preserve those
supplies for their most beneficial use in the areas that lack water.
The second component of a groundwater management system for
California is based upon the statutory groundwater program of the
state of Oklahoma.2 75 This component, when combined with the base
of stored supplemental water, adds a measure of certainty to groundwater law in California.
B.

Oklahoma GroundwaterLaw. A Modelfor Caiffornia

Oklahoma applies the American rule of "reasonable use" to its
groundwater.27 6 Under the "reasonable use rule" a landowner owns
use of that water as long as that use is reasonable.27 7 The "reasonable
use rule" places fewer restrictions on the overlying owner's rights than
does the correlative rights doctrine of California 278 because in
Oklahoma an overlying landowner is not restricted by the correlative
rights of another owner. Even though Oklahoma overlying owners enjoyed liberal rights under this rule, Oklahoma saw fit to enact a state279
wide management system cutting back on these rights.
The Oklahoma groundwater statute parcels out withdrawals from
271. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 155-58.

272. See id. at 158.
273. See id. at 155-58.
274. See id. at 157.
275. See Trelease, Legal Solutions to GroundwaterProblems-A General Overview, 11 PAc.
L.J. 863, 869 (1979).
276. Jensen, The Allocation of Percolating Water Under the Oklahoma GroundwaterLaw of
1972, 14 TULSA L.J. 437, 455 (1979).
277. Trelease, supra note 260, at 867.
278. Id.
279. See generally OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 82, §§1020.1-1020.22.
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the groundwater basin on the basis of the number of acres overlying
that basin.28 ° The Oklahoma Water Resources Board must hydrologically survey each groundwater basin, determine the maximum annual
yield of that basin and then determine the amount of that water yield to
be allocated to each acre of overlying land.28 1 If more water becomes
available, then the allocated shares to the overlying owners may be increased.28 2 In addition, appropriative rights to groundwater would be
granted if surplus water was available. Through the quantification of
the water, each overlying owner would know precisely how much water
could be used, 283 and the basin would not be overextended. 28 4 Then
when more water became available, the shares would be increased,
therefore always keeping the groundwater basin in a state of equilibrium.28 5 If a neighbor used more than the allocated amount, then the
other overlying owners could enforce their rights.
California should enact a program similar to that of Oklahoma since
this type of program would bring certainty to water rights and provide
for a strong state agency.2 86 A California program, based on Oklahoma
law, would take into account prior rights287 in determining allocation
of water by using a priority system.2 88 Under the proposed California
program, to determine the allocation of water, the determination of
prior rights in the basin and the priority of those rights should be made
by the state by examining all current water rights in a particular basin.2 89 Hydrological studies of the basins to determine the maximum
yield within the basin would follow. 290 Hearings would be held by the
administering California state agency to ensure equitable determination of rights before the final decisions are made.2 9 ' Once the maximum yield is determined, allocations can be made based on surface
area of overlying land and the priority of prior water uses including
prior appropriative rights. 29 2 Permits would then be issued. 293 The
California administrative agency would be required to update the hydrological surveys periodically in order that allocations could be re280.
281.
282.
283.
284.

Id. §1020.6.
Id. §1020.4-1020.6, 1020.11.
Id. §1020.6.
Trelease, supra note 275, at 869.
Id.
285. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 82, §1020.6.
286. See id. §1020.1-.22; see also Trelease, supra note 273, at 869.
287. The language of the Oklahoma Statute suggests that rights under the prior law are superior to those acquired after 1972. See generally Jensen, supra note 274, at 462-65.
288. This program would be justified. See infra note 295.
289. See Jensen, supra note 276, at 465.
290. Id.
291. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, §1020.6.
292. See Jensen, supra note 276, at 465.
293.

OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, §1020.9.
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vised. 9 4 The final allocation of water to landowners and subsequent
modifications does not create new rights or destroy old rights, but

rather manages existing rights based on land ownership. 295 This proposal would provide certainty in California water law by allowing for
sensible allocation of water based upon availability. 96 The California
proposal, however, would not destroy existing rights but would only
modify rights in the name of management of the scarce resource. This

proposal looks toward a broad and comprehensive range of state control that would put into effect the constitutional mandate that water be
put to the most beneficial use.
A wide range of state control, however, does not mean that local

agencies would not be without an important role in this California proposal. The use of local input comprises the third component of this
comprehensive state management proposal.
C. The Local Role in a CaliforniaManagement System

The third component of the comprehensive California management
program should include local management programs, as well as local
subdivisions that are already in existence. 297 The agencies could assist
the state in determining how much water is available and what prior
rights are involved in the basin. The local California agencies can also

advise as to the most beneficial uses for a particular local basin. The
local assistance would greatly aid the state in making the final allocation of water, while at the same time help to protect local interest.
These local districts should then manage the allocations of water and

changes in available water that occur. In areas lacking management
authorities, the state could step in to efficiently manage the areas or
provide for designation of authorities over which the state would be
294. Id. at § 1020.4.
295. There may be a constitutional problem if such a proposal was viewed as a destruction of
water rights. See CAL. CONST. art. X, §2. This proposal, however, should be viewed as a simple
modification of water rights. The decision of In re Water of Long Valley Creek System, 25 Cal. 3d
339, 599 P.2d 656, 158 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1979), shows the continuing flexibility that the California
Supreme Court affords the state to redefine water rights in terms of reasonable and beneficial uses.
The Court cited Joslin for the proposition that the SWRCB has the power to determine the scope,
nature, and priority of surface rights to promote reasonable and beneficial use. Id. at 353-54. The
court stated that the SWRCB had the power to prioritize rights along a stream system. Id. at 35859, 599 P.2d 668-69, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 362-63. The court, therefore, redefined water rights since
traditionally a riparian owner could make any reasonable use of water, including the use of more
water over more acreage. Long Valley interpreted the Constitutional Amendment of 1928 with
respect to surface water rights; however, that Constitutional provision also applies to groundwater
rights. See Peabody v. City of Vallejo, 2 Cal. 2d 351, 40 P.2d 486 (1935). Therefore, by applying
the decision of Long Valley, groundwater rights can be redefined for the goal of groundwater
management that would make the most reasonable and beneficial use of the groundwater of the
state. See Rossmann & Steel, supra note 28, at 912-13.
296. See Trelease, supra note 275, at 869.
297. See supra notes 165-177 and accompanying text.
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given final approval. Although the proposed comprehensive program
would make use of local authorities already in existence, the state must
be given broad control in order to efficiently manage the overall water
needs of California.
The three suggested components of the proposed comprehensive program-storage and conjunctive uses, allocations of water based on
available supplies and priorities, and local assistance-will provide an
efficient comprehensive management system for the state of California.
Under the proposal, conjunctive uses of water will play an important
role in allowing for efficient use of supplemental water for use in areas
of high overdraft.29 8 Once again, local agencies should have a large
measure of say as to what the most beneficial use of all the water resources would be, and the state would be the final arbitrator so that the
limited resource of groundwater is not overextended. An efficient management program created and overseen by the state with input from
local agencies would lead to the more efficient use of water and the
prevention of waste, while landowners would still maintain rights in
the water. This plan would bring comprehensive groundwater management to California.2 9 9 The Legislature of the State of California has
the power to enact this proposed management program. 300 The legislative enactment of the comprehensive proposal would be a legitimate
exercise of the police power that would not result in the taking of any
landowners property rights in groundwater. °1
D. ConstitutionalAuthorityfor the Management of California
Groundwater Through Legislation
The suggested comprehensive management program will mean substantial modification to the groundwater rights in California, which in
turn raises the issue of a compensable taking under the California Constitution. This same question was raised when the 1928 Constitutional
Amendment, providing for water to be put to reasonable and beneficial
298. See supra notes 257-274 and accompanying text.
299. The most recent attempt at groundwater management was the Water Resources Initiative
Statute that went down to defeat on the November 2, 1983 general ballot. The Initiative would
have established state supervised groundwater management in I I critically overdrafted basins
designated by the Department of Water Resources. The Initiative used the vehicle of local management for conservation and a strong state role through enforcement provisions. Although the
Initiative was on the correct track by providing for a stronger state influence in the management of
groundwater, there still was no provision for an all-encompassing management system at a statewide level. See generally Proposition 13, California Ballot Pamphlet, General Election 1982 (proposed amendment to CAL. WATER CODE §§15000-15405) (copy on file at the Pac/ic Law Journal).
To have an efficient management program that will overcome uncertainty and overdrafting, the
state must use all of its water resources effectively for the good of the entire state.
300. See infra notes 302-3 10 and accompanying text.
301. "Private property may be taken or damaged for public use only when just compensation
...
has first been paid ..
" CAL. CONsT. art. 1, §19.
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use, was passed. 3°2 The 1928 Amendment, 30 3 however, was interpreted
in Joslin v. MarinMunicipal Water District3°4 to permit the state to operate under the provisions of the amendment limiting water rights,
without requiring the exercise of the eminent domain provisions of the
California Constitution because the amendment reasonably exercises
the police power of the state. 30 5 The court was of the view that the
Amendment redefines water rights. 3 °6 The court stated that no property right can exist in an unreasonable use and the deprivation of that
unreasonable use is not a compensable taking.30 7 The court went on to
say:
...[s]uch an inquiry cannot be resolved in vacuo isolated from
statewide considerations of transcendent importance. Paramount
among these we see the ever increasing need for conservation of
quite apart from its
water in this state, an inescapable reality of life
30 8
express recognition in the 1928 Amendment.
Thus, the California Supreme Court, in Joslin, upheld the power of the
state to modify existing water rights without compensating those who
would take less water under a subsequent ruling of reasonable and beneficial use.30 9 Applying the same rationale to the proposed management system, the state could modify existing water rights for the benefit
of the overall scheme of reasonable use and conservation of the limited
resource of groundwater without compensating the parties involved.3 0
Therefore, not only is the proposed system vital to meet an essential
need of the state of California, but the proposal also would be a legitimate exercise of police power of the state.
CONCLUSION

As Judge Ronald B. Robie, 3 1 1 past-Director of the Department of
Water Resources, recently stated:
In my opinion, the acceleration of groundwater problems and general absence of solutions since (1960). . . have demonstrated beyond
any doubt that 'ad hoe' solutions are not satisfactory. I find it curious
that although regulation of surface waters is properly a responsibility
302. 67 Cal. 2d 132, 144, 429 P.2d 889, 897, 60 Cal. Rptr. 377, 384 (1967).
303. CAL. CONST. art. X, §2.
304. 67 Cal. 2d 132, 429 P.2d 889, 60 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1967).
305. Id. at 144, 429 P.2d at 897, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 384.
306. Id., 429 P.2d at 897, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 384.
307. Id. at 140, 429 P.2d at 894, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 381.
308. Id. (footnote omitted).
309. Rossmann & Steel, supra note 28, at 912.
310. See supra notes 303-309 and accompanying text.
311. Municipal Court Judge, County of Sacramento; Adjunct Professor of Law, University of
the Pacific McGeorge School of Law.
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of the state, groundwater regulation is somehow viewed as a 'local'
concern ....
The lack of adequate state authority in allocating water resources
encourages poor local decisions . . . . The
result is uncoordinated
3 12
administration of interrelated resources.
Groundwater is a valuable and limited resource upon which all
Californians rely. 3 13 Limited resources must be effectively managed in
order to put them to their most productive, beneficial, and lasting uses.
One authority, however, states that the California solution to the underground water problems of the state is to simply "pour water on it
and it will go away. ' 314 California must meet its responsibility to efficiently manage all its groundwater resources because the problems will
not go away by simply pouring water on them. The problems of destruction of the resource, overdrafting, decreased production, and legal
uncertainty of rights will only worsen.
The California Constitution and current statutes call for an efficient
groundwater management program that would put the resource to its
most reasonable and beneficial use. 3 15 The California Legislature,
however, has not responded. 316 The job of efficient management of this
resource cannot be left to the courts or local agencies since they have
neither the resources nor the capacity to manage for the good of the
entire state.3 17

California needs a comprehensive management program that will integrate surface water through conjunctive use, with an administrative
318
process run by the state with the help and input of local agencies.
The proposed management program would redefine respective rights
without destroying rights, 3 9 and provide an agency to manage all the
intricacies involved in water resource management.3 20 The end result
of the proposed comprehensive groundwater management program
will be to put groundwater to its most reasonable and beneficial use.

Michael P. Mallery
312. Robie, Carley Porter Memorial Luncheon Address, in Proceedings of the Ninth Biennial
Conference on Groundwater 146 (1973) (emphasis in original). The debate over a stronger state
management of groundwater versus local control has been going on for years. See Schneider,
supra note 2, at 91-3.
313. See supra notes 2-8 and accompanying text.
314. Trelease, supra note 275, at 865.
315. See supra notes 200-24 and accompanying text.
316. See supra notes 226-37 and accompanying text.
317. See supra notes 43-183 and accompanying text.
318. See supra notes 255-99 and accompanying text.
319. See supra notes 255-99 and accompanying text.
320. See supra notes 255-99 and accompanying text.
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